7. Governance Framework

7. Governance Framework

The MetaSoilVerse Protocol (MSVP) introduces a decentralized governance model that ensures protocol integrity, flexibility across jurisdictions, and community stewardship. The governance system is anchored in on-chain logic, balancing token-weighted decision-making with mechanisms to encourage fairness and decentralization.

MSVP governance is implemented through the MSV DAO , which holds the ultimate authority over protocol upgrades, policy toggles, asset onboarding, staking rules, and treasury allocation. The design prioritizes trust minimization, transparency, and formal logic enforcement , while retaining agility for real-world asset (RWA) operations.

7.1 Governance Objectives

Governance within MSVP exists to:

Enable dynamic, permissionless evolution of protocol parameters

Allocate ecosystem resources (treasury, staking incentives, grants)

Protect the protocol from centralization and stagnation

Each function is underpinned by immutable smart contracts and a verifiable proposal system , where actions must be approved by quorum and governed by slashing rules if misused.

7.2 Governance Lifecycle: Phases

The DAO Proposal Lifecycle is composed of four deterministic steps. Each is executed with on-chain timestamping, proposal hashes, and identity-linked signatures to prevent manipulation.

Phase 1: Proposal Submission

Let P_i be a proposal submitted by user U_i .

For proposal P_i to be accepted into the queue:

Stake_required ≥ τ_min

Where:

Phase 2: Review Window (Community Audit)

Proposal P_i enters a mandatory review phase:

T_review = 5 days (default)

Protocol moderators (e.g., validators) highlight high-risk changes

Phase 3: Voting Period

Voting opens for eligible users:

T_vote = 7 days

Each user U_n votes v_n ∈ {YES, NO, ABSTAIN}

Two models exist:

Model A: Token-Weighted Voting

Vote_power(U_n) = MSVP_held(U_n) + MSVP_delegated(U_n)

Model B: Quadratic Voting (Optional per Proposal)

Vote_power(U_n) = √(MSVP_voted(U_n))

This reduces whale dominance and is recommended for asset onboarding and region-specific proposals.

Quorum Q_required and Supermajority M are required for passage:

Q_required = 5% of circulating $MSVP

M = ≥ 66% YES votes among cast votes

Phase 4: Execution Phase

If P_i is approved:

Execution contracts have strict scope (e.g., registry upgrades, fee schedule update) and cannot mutate core token logic unless explicitly unlocked via meta-proposal.

7.3 Proposal Types and Permissions

Proposal types include:

7.4 DAO Treasury Governance

15% of all $MSVP is reserved in a time-locked DAO Treasury . This fund can be deployed via governance votes for:

Treasury disbursements follow this formula:

D(t) = Min{R, B_max(t)}

Where:

The system prevents rapid depletion by enforcing per-cycle budget caps.

7.5 Slashing Governance for Asset Validators

As per MSVP’s Proof of Asset Integrity (PoAI) model, validators who misreport data (e.g., uptime, ownership, yield distribution) are subject to governance-controlled slashing .

Slashing rule:

If validator V_i exceeds fault threshold θ,

Then Slashed_amount = x_i (stake of V_i)

The θ and x_i values are tunable via DAO, with hard-coded guardrails:

7.6 Compliance Region Toggles

Each RWA added to MSVP must map to a jurisdictional module , which contains toggleable options:

These toggles are activated by proposal and set globally or per-asset. The goal is to allow country-specific compliance without compromising protocol neutrality.

7.7 Emergency Governance Escalation

In case of a protocol vulnerability or oracle failure:

This system is intended only for critical protocol survivability scenarios.

7.8 Delegated Voting and Reputation

MSVP will support off-chain delegation registries , allowing users to assign voting rights to trusted delegates without transferring token custody. Future implementation may include:

7.9 Governance Upgradeability

While governance parameters (quorum, thresholds) are adjustable, governance logic itself is governed by meta-governance: